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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of JASON PENA,
Petitioner,
-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 0 1-07-ST7744 Index No. 4096-07
Appearances :

Jason Pena
Inmate No. 95-A-0070
Petitioner, Pro Se
Gouverneur Correctional Facility
Scotch Settlement Road
P.O. Box 480
Gouverneur, NY 13642-0370
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
120 Broadway, 24thFloor
New York, New York 10271
(Jose L. Velez,
Assistant Attorney General
01Cuuirsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

The petitioner, an inmate currently residing at Gauverneur Correctional Facility, has
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commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent
dated December 20, 2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is
serving a term of eight and a third to twenty five years on a conviction of first-degree
manslaughter, running concurrently with a term of five to fifteen years for a conviction of
second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and consecutively with a term of one and a
half to three years for attempted first-degree promotion of prison contraband. Among the
many arguments raised by petitioner (including those advanced in his administrative appeal)
petitioner asserts that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors under
Executive Law tj 2594. In his view, the determination was based solely on the seriousness
of the crimes for which he was incarcerated. He maintains that the Parole Board failed to
consider his accomplishments while incarcerated', or his plans upon being released. He takes
the position that the Parole Board improperly re-sentenced him to an additional term of
imprisonment. In the petitioner's view, the Parole Board erred in not providing guidance as
to how he could qualify for parole in the future. Petitioner also asserts that the Parole Board
failed to provide anything other than general reasons for its determination, and that this
violated his rights to due process. Finally petitioner asserts that respondent's decision not
to parole him violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and New York
Constitutions.

'Petitioner provided a list of his activities while he has been incarcerated which include
all of the following: earning a G.E.D., completion of several programs including ASAT, ART ,
AVP as well as programs on welding and plumbing, completion of DOCS Alcohol and
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employment in the prison kitchen and as a housing porter.
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Petitioner’s assertion that the Parole Board based it’s determination to deny parole
solely upon the serious nature of the crimes for which the petitioner was incarcerated for,
while not considering his various accomplishments during that incarceration is belied by the
record.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“The I.O., Manslaughter lS‘, CPW 2nd, Att. Promoting
Contraband, involved you shooting ap person in the head and
multiple times in his body as he lay on the ground, causing
death. The Att. Promotion of Prison Contraband involved you
possessing a weapon while in prison. This panel had made note
of two Tier I1 infractions for unhygienic act and fighting since
your last board. During your interview, you expressed little
remorse for the victim and demonstrated limited insight into
why you were so violent as to take a human life. This panel has
noted your improved discipline and programmatic performance,
however, when we consider all relevant factors, including your
age, we believe that you need additional time in a structured
setting. Return with a clean disciplinary record and continue to
improve yourself.”
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
IXy-nine-c of this article 5hall require that the following bc
cuiisidcred: (i) h e irisrituhmd rccilrd iiducliiig prograin goals

m d accnmplishments. w x l e r n i c whievements, vrscntinnnl

education, training or work assignments, therapy and
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interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (blattcr d Siriopuli

1,

Nmc York Stae Board ofParole.189

AD2d 960,960 [3rdDept., 19931, citing b1;iitrr o~Mc.E;cc.1 . N u \ York S u t c Bd. ofparole,
157 AD2d 944). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau v.

Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting
Miutcr 01 Kusso br. NCNk’urk Slaic. Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence

of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made

AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his education, his employment history while
incarcerated, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. Furthermore, the decision
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was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and
it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (seeMatter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 1
AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199
AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board
consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir
v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of
Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v
Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter
of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d
556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight
to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly
discuss each one (seeMatter of Farid v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd.
of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Collado v New York State Division
of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3rd Dept., 20011). Nor must the parole board recite the precise
statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law
Matter of Silvern v Dennis-,

6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see

28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere

appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the
circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her
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the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law"' (Matter of Durio v New
York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to
sentencing are conclusory and without merit

ii

ru-

(see Matter of Bockeno v New York State

Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
1)cpartInerit Brurd of' .4ppcafs i init. 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v

Dennison, 13Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Marlzr oLBurress + Dcwiism, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument

(see Matter of

Lue-Shim v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827,828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New
York Division of Pnrolc, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293

AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051,
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061).
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged vinlr\tinn of his right to
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due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 0 2594, since it does not create

an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Chord, 255 F3d 40 [2ndCir., 20011, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock (5 16
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY,
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation.
The Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months)
is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (see,Matter of Tatta v State
ofNew York, Division ofparole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604).
Furthermore, petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board is required to advise
petitioner and/or provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or
rehabilitative efforts he should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole
interview has no merit (see Executive Law

5 2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR 0 8002.3; Boothe v

Hammock, 605 F2d 661 [2ndCir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of
Parole 21 AD3d 1174 [3rdDept., 20051).

-9

Finally, with respect to petitioner’s equal protection argument, the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within
their jurisdiction the cqunl pi-otc‘ctio~iof thc lati s, but

doi.5

not p l - c ~ ~ cthr.
i ~ tSkitcs fiwn

making reasonable classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of
Equalization, 451 US 648, 68 L Ed 2d 514, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [1981]). Where the action
tinder review d n w not invnlrc n riirpcct clnw nr fiindnmcntnl ripht. it i s not whjcct tta F:tt.ict
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judicial scrutiny, but rather is examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the
action violated the equal protection clause (see,Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia,
427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d 520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250).
In this instance there is simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that
the respondent’s determination was motivated by impermissible considerations(see Giordano
v City of New York, 274 F3d 740, 75 1 [Znd Cir., 20011).
The Court has reviewed petitioner’sremaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry.

ENTER
September 34(,2007
Troy, New York

Dated:

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.

2.

Order To Show Cause dated Verified Petition, Memorandum of Law,
Supporting Papers and Exhibits
Respondent’s VeriGed Answer dated February 2 1, 2007, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits

